Research on dynamic decision-making tasks, in which the payoffs associated with each choice vary with participants' recent choice history, shows that humans have difficulty making long-term optimal choices in the presence of attractive immediate rewards. However, a number of recent studies have shown that simple cues providing information about the underlying state of the task environment may facilitate optimal responding. This study examines the mechanism by which this state knowledge influences choice behavior. We examine the possibility that participants use state information in conjunction with changing payoffs to extrapolate payoffs in future states. We find support for this hypothesis in a study in which generalizations based on this state information work to the benefit or detriment of task performance, depending on the task's payoff structure. 
Introduction
In many real-world situations short-term rewards conflict with long-term benefits. Consider the case of global warming, for which a group's difficulty in changing its behavior reflects a considerable difference in immediate payoffs between long-term beneficial and longterm detrimental actions. That is, the long-term detrimental action (unrestricted pollution) results in greater immediate reward (higher industrial output, greater comfort) than the long-term beneficial option, which involves receiving smaller immediate rewards (lower industrial output, reduced comfort) but contributing to a larger overall pattern of reward in the long term (greater overall quality of life). Effective decision-making in real-world situations involves not only weighing the costs and benefits of particular actions, but also understanding how actions in the past influence the costs and benefits of future actions. It should be noted that this class of problem differs from those used in studies of delay discounting in humans (e.g. Myerson & Green, 1995) in which single decisions are made on the basis of explicit instructions and it is made clear at what point in time the larger, delayed rewards are received (Rachlin, 1995) .
In this paper, we examine how information about the state of the world affects decisionmaking in dynamic tasks that require valuing either long-term or short-term rewards. Unlike static and one-shot decision making problems in which the payoff contingencies are not influenced by participants' behavior (e.g., Ido & Barron, 2005) , in our task, the possible payoffs associated with each choice change as a function of a participant's recent choices. Thus, participants' behavior in the task can effectively influence the state of the task environment, which in turn has consequences for future rewards. In our experiments, we manipulated the information that people had about the current task state in order to study the relationship between their mental representation of the task, and their ability to adopt effective decision strategies.
For example, in Figure 1A each curve represents the payoff from one of two choice options in a repeated-choice task. The horizontal axis represents the current "state" of the task environment while the vertical axis represents the payoff from selecting either choice. In all states, one option (which we call Long-Term Decreasing (LT-D)), always yields a higher payoff than the other option (called the Long-Term Increasing, or LT-I). Note that the current task state is defined as the number of LT-I choices made over the last ten trials. Increases in the proportion of LT-I selections in one's history shift the current state of the system rightwards on the horizontal axis (increasing the payoffs for both choices), while increases in the proportion of LT-D selections move the state leftward (decreasing the payoffs for both choices). Thus, options that lead to larger immediate payoffs negatively affect future payoffs, while options that are less immediately attractive lead to larger future payoffs.
Consider a participant who has made only LT-D choices for 10 trials in a row, effectively making the task state 0. The payoffs from the LT-I and LT-D choices would be 30 and 40 respectively. If she makes one LT-I choice at this point, her task state would change to 1, as only 1 out of 10 of the last trials were LT-I choices. Consequently, the LT-I and LT-D choices would result in payoffs of 45 and 35, respectively. The payoffs associated with the choices fluctuate with the recent choice behavior of the participant.
In this dynamic payoff structure, a payoff-maximizing response pattern requires forgoing the LT-D choice and continually making LT-I choices (because the equilibrium point for the LT-I option is higher than for repeated selections of the LT-D option). However, this strategy is not apparent to participants at the outset and must be learned through experience. Prior research using similar payoff structures suggests that under certain task environment conditions, people eventually learn the optimal reward-maximizing response strategy (Herrnstein et al., 1993; Tunney & Shanks, 2002) . One question of interest in the literature concerns the sort of information that facilitates globally optimal responding in these tasks (Neth, Sims, & Gray, 2006) . Gureckis and Love (in press) pointed out that one challenge participants face in this class of tasks is forming an appropriate representation of the state of the task environment. Each time a participant makes a selection, the environment state can change such that the payoff for the chosen option changes on the next trial. Thus, it is not transparent to participants whether the task environment itself is changing or whether choice payoffs are simply fluctuating over time. In the standard version of this task (e.g., Herrnstein et al., 1993, Experiment 3; Tunney & Shanks, 2002, Experiment 2) , it is difficult to recognize these changes without information that specifies the current state of the environment. One may view the problem as one of perceptual aliasing wherein the decision-maker confounds environment states that it must distinguish in order to solve the task (Whitehead & Ballard, 1991) .
Perceptual aliasing is a common problem that arises in spatial navigation tasks where observations often fail to differentiate between multiple locations that an agent may actually occupy (Stankiewicz, Legge, Mansfield, & Schlicht, 2006) . Historically, this literature has emphasized the importance of landmarks, defined as salient contextual cues associated with particular states or locations in the environment that serve as anchors or reference points to guide decision making and planning (O'Keefe & Nadel, 1978) . There is evidence that landmarks play a prominent role in navigation performance for both humans and animals in spatial tasks (Cartwright & Collett, 1982 , Siegel & White, 1975 , but little research has examined the role of landmarks in other types of sequential decision spaces. In the class of dynamic decision-making tasks considered in this paper, the states are more abstract, representing the individual's recent choice history as opposed to concrete spatial locations within the environment. Landmark-type information may bear influence on decision-making performance in these tasks. Gureckis and Love (in press) found that an accurate representation of the task environment state facilitated optimal decision-making behavior, consistent with ReinforcementLearning (RL) models (Sutton & Barto, 1998) . Key to their behavior manipulations was the presentation of perceptual state cues (akin to visually salient landmarks) which indicated the current task state. In Gureckis and Love's study, participants saw an array of 11 lights arranged horizontally across the screen, only one of which was active. The location of the active light perfectly correlated with the current state of the task environment (i.e., the number of LT-I responses made over the last 10 trials). This manipulation is similar to that employed by Herrnstein et al. (1993;  Experiment 1) which found a marginally beneficial effect on participants' ability to maximize long-term payoffs when a cue was provided indicating the task state. However, in Gureckis and Love's study, the impact of two different types of perceptual cues were evaluated: in one condition, the currently active cue moved unidirectionally with the changing state from one end of the cue array to the other, while in another condition, the cue positions mapped randomly to different task states. While both types of cues made clear that each choice changed the current task state-thereby helping participants overcome the problem of perceptual aliasing-the authors found that only unidirectional cues significantly improved participants' ability to make long-term payoff-maximizing responses compared to participants who did not have any disambiguating perceptual information.
Gureckis and Love suggested that observing the covariance between changing payoffs and the systematic movement of the state cue led participants to generalize experience acquired in one state to other, not-yet-experienced states, akin to extrapolating the slopes of the payoff curves. That is, participants who successfully learned that the payoffs were greater in state 2 (i.e., the number of LT-I responses over the last 10 trials was 2) than in state 1 might have extrapolated this relationship to predict greater payoffs in states 9 and 10. Consequently, these participants were better able to move systematically through the decision space, adopting nearoptimal response patterns. Simulations of an RL model-utilizing a simple linear network to estimate action values for each choice-revealed that supplying the model with consistent state information afforded extrapolation of rewards in unexperienced states, and subsequently improved performance. Further, this model provided the best account of participants' behavior in comparison to other contemporary RL models (Bogacz et al., 2007; Daw et al., 2006) . The authors concluded that local state information helped participants adopt optimal response patterns by reducing the perceptual aliasing inherent in abstract decision spaces.
One possible explanation of Gureckis and Love's findings is that participants provided with cues engaged in more systematic exploration of the state space and realized that there are two "fixed points" associated with the endpoints of the cue arrangement where the payoffs no longer change. Through explicit comparison of the payoffs associated with these end-point landmarks (namely, the minimum of LT-D and the maximum of LT-I, which are located at states 0 and 10 respectively), participants would settle on a strategy of consistent LT-I choices as the maximum of the LT-I option yields greater payoffs than the minimum of the LT-D curve. Alternatively, Gureckis and Love's model predicts that participants extrapolated the gradient of the payoff function, performing actions that guided them "upwards" to the optimal state. In other words, participants generalize from the local signal of rising payoffs, leading them to make repeated LT-I choices until they reach the global maximum of the LT-I payoff function. This local strategy is effective because the optimal strategy in the task requires repeated LT-I choice.
The "fixed points" and "generalization" accounts can be dissociated. If the payoff curves are spaced further apart, such that LT-I is no longer a globally optimal choice (as shown in Figure 1B ), participants following the payoff gradient should actually do worse overall when provided with cues because chasing the rising rewards is not the globally maximizing strategy.
The experiments reported here elucidate the candidate mechanisms-specifically, the fixed points view and the generalization view assumed by Gureckis and Love-responsible for human choice patterns in dynamic decision-making environments. Using a task environment similar to Gureckis and Love, we manipulated the properties of the payoff curves to create situations in which linear extrapolation from one state to the next either does or does not lead participants to make consistently optimal choices. To foreshadow, our results suggest that participants indeed utilize payoff estimates obtained from generalization, a strategy that can lead to suboptimal performance depending on the reward structure.
In the present experiment, we examine how participants use consistent state information to guide their choices. The experimental procedure is similar to the one used by Gureckis and Love (Experiment 2, in press). Payoff curves varied between participants. In one case, the curves for the LT-D and LT-I responses were placed close together so that the optimal strategy is to always choose the LT-I (see Figure 1A) . In the other, we spaced the curves far apart (without changing their slope), such that the optimal strategy is to actually choose the LT-D option ( Figure 1B) . By comparing the choice allocations of participants for these two payoff structures with and without these landmark-like cues, we can determine whether generalization about payoff function gradients is indeed the mechanism by which these cues drive choice behavior.
If consistent state cues assist participants with systematic exploration of the decision space according to the fixed points view, state cues should lead participants to make repeated LT-I choices in the Close Together payoff structure ( Figure 1A ) and repeated LT-D choices in the Far Apart payoff structure ( Figure 1B) . In other words, as comparison of payoffs at fixed points reveals the optimal long-term response strategy to participants, the fixed points hypothesis predicts that participants with state cues will make significantly more optimal decisions than those without state cues in both payoff structures.
On the other hand, if choices are driven by generalization from unidirectional cue movement and payoff gradients, then "following" the positive slope of the LT-I curve should lead participants with state cues to make repeated LT-I choices in both payoff structures. That strategy is optimal for the Close Together payoff structure. In contrast, this strategy is suboptimal in the Far Apart payoff structure, where the minimum payoff of the LT-D choice exceeds the maximum of the LT-I choice. According to this view, participants with state cues should make a greater proportion of LT-I choices in both payoff structure conditions because the state information will promote generalization/extrapolation about payoff curve slopes. Crucially, the generalization view predicts that participants will perform less optimally with cues than without cues in the Far Apart payoff structure.
Method Participants A total of 104 undergraduates at the University of Texas at Austin participated in this experiment for course credit plus a small cash bonus tied to performance on the task. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions that varied in both the payoff structure (Close Together or Far Apart) and the presence or absence of state cues (Cues vs. No Cues). Twentysix participants were assigned to each condition.
Materials
The experiment stimuli and instructions were displayed on 17-inch monitors. The participants read a cover story about extracting oxygen from the Mars atmosphere, and told that their goal was to maximize overall long-term extraction by pressing one of two buttons each trial, corresponding to two systems for oxygen extraction. Participants were informed that the specific oxygen-extracting properties of the two systems were unknown but that they should learn the best strategy. It was also explained that each decision could temporarily change the quality of the atmosphere.
Procedure
The experiment consisted of 500 trials. At the start of the experiment, the number of LT-I responses over the last 10 trials (i.e., the state) was initialized to five. On each trial, participants were presented with a control panel with two buttons labeled "Robot 1" and "Robot 2," shown in Figure 2 . Using the mouse, participants clicked one of the buttons to indicate their choice, after which a chirping sound was played and the payoff was presented visually using an 11x11 grid of blue dots. The number of visible dots indicated the number of oxygen points extracted on that trial, also shown in Figure 2 .
As described above, in the Close Together payoff structure condition ( Figure 1A ), the number of oxygen points generated for selections of the LT-I option was 30+50*(h/10), while the payoff for selecting the LT-D option was 40+50*(h/10), where h in both equations represents the number of LT-I choices made by the participant over the last 10 trials. In contrast, in the Far Apart reward curves shown in Figure 1B , the payoff for LT-I was defined by 5+50*(h/10) and the payoff for LT-D was 65+50*(h/10).
Participants in the Cues condition saw a display that included a row of eleven dots, one for each possible state, above the two choice buttons as shown in Figure 2 . The position of the active dot indicated the current state h, ranging from 0 to 10 (akin to position on the horizontal axis in Figures 1A and 1B) . Each time the participant made a choice, the position of active dot was updated to reflect the state of the task environment. The presence and function of these state cues were not mentioned in the task instructions. This row of dots was not present for participants in the no cues condition.
The mapping of response buttons to choices and the direction of cue movement (leftwards or rightwards as h increased) were counterbalanced across participants. At the end of the trials, participants were paid a cash bonus commensurate with their cumulative payoffs.
Results The main dependent measure was the proportion of trials for which participants made LT-I responses, depicted in Figure 3A . In short, our results favor Gureckis and Love's (in press) generalization view over the "fixed points" view. A 2 (payoff structure) X 2 (presence of state cues) ANOVA revealed a main effect of cue presence, F(1,102) Optimality of responding was measured by calculating the proportion of each participant's cumulative payoff to the maximum possible cumulative payoff under an optimal pure response strategy (strictly LT-I responses in the Close Together condition and strictly LT-D responses in the Far Apart condition). These average cumulative payoff proportions are depicted in Figure 3B . A 2 (distance between reward curves) X 2 (presence of state cues) ANOVA on this measure revealed a significant interaction, F(1,102) =-4.102, p<.001] . As predicted by the generalization view, participants in the Far Apart payoff structure responded less optimally with cues than without cues.
Additionally, we evaluated the extent to which state cues facilitate systematic exploration of the state space. While the "fixed points" view predicts participants with state cues should visit both fixed points (namely the minimum and maximum of the LT-D and LT-I payoff curves respectively) and remain there long enough to observe that the payoffs stop changing, the generalization view predicts that state cues would simply drive participants towards the maximum of the LT-I curve. As a proxy, we considered a fixed point as "visited" if a participant had spent at least 10 consecutive trials in that state. The proportions of participants in each condition who "visited" both fixed points are depicted in Figure 4 . A smaller proportion of participants with state cues (31% and 23% of participants in the Close Together and Far Apart conditions, respectively) visited those points than participants without state cues (38% and 53% of participants in the Close Together and Far Apart conditions respectively). A log-linear model was fit to the data revealing a significant effect of state cues on this measure, χ 2 (1,N=104)=4.18, p<.05. This trend in exploration behavior supports the generalization hypothesis over the "fixed points" view. Discussion This article examined the mechanism by which landmark-like state cues drive choice behavior in a dynamic decision task. The results of the experiment reported demonstrate how consistent cues reflecting the task environment state can lead participants either towards or away from globally optimal response patterns. State cues led to optimal choices when the payoff curves were close together, but sub-optimal choices when they were far apart.
According to Gureckis and Love (in press ), these cues afford generalization about local changes in rewards, which leads to suboptimal responding with the Far Apart payoff curves and optimal responding with the Close Together payoff curves. If state cues were simply facilitating explicit comparison between the payoffs at fixed end-points, we would expect to see optimal patterns of choice in the Far Apart Condition. Instead, participants with state cues adopt the strategy observed by Gureckis and Love -generalizing about the payoff curve gradients and following local changes in reward-regardless of the positioning of the payoff curves. This extrapolation behavior can make locally inferior options with rising payoffs attractive even in cases where such options are globally sub-optimal.
A number of previous studies that have examined the impact of additional information (that is, beyond immediate choice payoffs) on choice behavior in dynamic decision-making environments deserve mention. Warry et al. (1999) found that providing the expected payoffs of the choices on the next trial facilitated optimal choice behavior when difference in immediate payoffs between payoff curves was large. In contrast, Neth et al. (2006) found that even prospective feedback reflecting participants' expected total earnings-emphasizing the global suboptimality of their choices-did not alter participants' ability to make globally optimal choices. Both of these manipulations attempted to influence globally optimal responding using global patterns of feedback. In contrast, our results show that local information (i.e., information about the current state) can have a strong impact on behavior. Our study shares some similarities with Herrnstein et al. (1993) which reports that a simple cue reflecting the current state of the task environment improved participants' ability to make payoff-maximizing responses. The present work extends upon these investigations, elucidating the mechanisms by which people, for better of for worse, utilize local state information to infer global solutions-specifically, we find that local state information facilitates generalization about payoff gradients. Surprisingly and counterintuitively, the efforts documented above were not able to elicit global changes in behavior even with global feedback.
It is well-documented that humans make use of landmark information to guide them through spatial decision spaces (e.g., Siegel and White, 1975) . However, the present study evaluates the role of these cues in other more abstract decision spaces. We find that humans use the structure of such cues to make inferences about unseen, future rewards-which can sometimes lead to suboptimal performance. One can easily conceive of more complex decision environment in which the optimal response strategies is more complex than the "pure" strategy (i.e., repeatedly select the LT-I option) tested here. In these situations, adopting a strategy of following rising rewards-especially in the face of consistent state information-may be a kind of heuristic. Gureckis & Love) . Of particular interest is the fact that highest point of the LT-I curve is higher than the lowest point of the LT-D curve. Thus, the optimal strategy is to choose the LT-I option on every trial. In contrast, consider the payoff structure depicted in Figure 1B . Like Figure 1A , the LT-D choice always generates higher immediate payoffs than the LT-I choice. However, the global minimum of the LT-D payoff curve is greater than the global maximum of the LT-I payoff curve. Among pure response strategies, consistently choosing LT-D is the optimal pattern of response. Critically, optimal behavior in the two payoff structures depicted in Figures 1A (i. e. "Close Together") and 1B (i.e., "Far Apart") requires different patterns of choices. The two reward curves were tested in Experiment 1. 
